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We develop an integrated framework for studying income conver-
gence that incorporates traditional measures of b-convergence and
s-convergence. These concepts are formally linked by a measure of
re-ranking (or leapfrogging). Our proposed measure of b-convergence
allows for nonlinearities in the growth process and explicitly identifies the
contribution of faster growth among low-income regions to reductions in
overall inequality. To develop our framework we exploit the close links
that exist between studies of income convergence and studies that
examine the progressivity of the tax system. We illustrate our approach
by examining both cross-country and regional income dynamics.
1 Introduction
The extent to which incomes have converged over time has been the focus of
a large body of research in growth economics. This literature, however, has
resulted in a lot of controversy, debate and confusion as to how one should
measure and interpret income convergence.1 The dominant approach in the
early literature is characterized by the work of Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992). This involves regressing income growth rates on initial income to test
whether poor countries grow faster than rich countries. However, several
authors (Friedman, 1992; Quah, 1993) have argued that these regressions tell
us little about whether income dispersion across countries has fallen: it is
possible to observe poor countries growing faster than rich countries and yet
for incomes to diverge. For this to happen it must be the case that the initially
poorer countries overtake/leapfrog the richer countries, so that the rankings
* Manuscript received 14.6.06; final version received 6.8.07.
†We would like to thank Gerry Boyle, Denis Conniffe, Olive Sweetman, Dirk Van de Gaer, two
anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the Dublin Economics Workshop (Trinity
College Dublin), NUI Maynooth, the Royal Economic Society meeting (Swansea) and the
International Conference in Memory of Gini and Lorenz (University of Siena) for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1Examples of recent studies of convergence include de la Fuente (2003), Phillips and Sul (2003)
and de Groot et al. (2005), while Islam (2003) provides an overview of the established
literature.
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1
of countries change.2 To distinguish between these different forms of conver-
gence, Sala-i-Martin (1996a) coined the term ‘b-convergence’ to capture situ-
ations where ‘poor economies tend to grow faster than rich ones’. In contrast
a sample of countries are said to exhibit ‘s-convergence’ if ‘the dispersion of
their real per capita GDP levels tends to decrease over time’. Friedman (1992)
has argued that the real test of convergence should focus on the consistent
diminution of variance among countries (s-convergence). Sala-i-Martin
(1996a, 1996b) maintains that both concepts of convergence are interesting
and should be analysed empirically.
In this paper we exploit the close links that exist between the conver-
gence literature and the tax progression literature to develop a new frame-
work for studying income dynamics. Our approach incorporates both
the alternative measures of convergence in a coherent way. We measure
s-convergence as the change in the Gini coefficient over time and use the
exact additive decomposition suggested by Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) to
express this change as the net effect of b-convergence when offset by ‘leap-
frogging’ among countries.3
Our framework reveals more about income dynamics than studies based
only on regression coefficients or correlation coefficients because we
simultaneously measure three distinct facets of distributional change:
s-convergence, b-convergence and leapfrogging.4 A number of authors (e.g.
Kalaitzidakis et al., 2000; Fiaschi and Lavezzi, 2003) criticize earlier work on
b-convergence for failing to allow for nonlinearities in the growth process. In
contrast to the traditional approach, our proposed measure of b-convergence
accommodates nonlinear growth processes. Furthermore, our approach
explicitly identifies the contribution of b-convergence to changes in overall
inequality across countries. It also leads to a more parsimonious representa-
tion of distributional change than full-scale estimation of the joint income
distribution. In addition, our approach can easily incorporate varying
degrees of inequality aversion when measuring dispersion.
2For a recent example of a theoretical growth model with leapfrogging/overtaking, see Sugimoto
(2006).
3Wodon and Yitzhaki (2005) look at growth and convergence using an alternative Gini-based
decomposition. Their approach differs from ours in that they adopt a specific social welfare
function, which they decompose into growth, inequality and mobility components. Our
focus is on the decomposition of changes in inequality.
4Hart (1995) shows that when income growth can be written as yi,t+1 - yi,t = byi,t + ei,t+1, the ratio
of the variance of incomes can be written as
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where r is the correlation of incomes in both periods. s-Convergence requires that b + 1 < r
or equivalently b < r - 1. Since r 2 1, this expression shows that b-convergence (b < 0) is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for s-convergence. While r can be thought of as one
particular index of mobility there is no direct relationship between r and the concept of
leapfrogging. Our decomposition, on the other hand, provides a non-parametric frame-
work in which the individual contributions of b-convergence and leapfrogging to changes
in overall inequality can be explicitly identified and measured.
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2 Decomposing Inequality Change
Previous studies of cross-country or regional income dispersion have tended
to use either the coefficient of variation of GDP (e.g. Friedman, 1992) or the
standard deviation of log GDP (e.g. Sala-i-Martin, 1996a) to summarize
income inequality. A number of alternative indices are available however.5 In
this paper, we follow Wodon and Yitzhaki (2005) and adopt the Gini index
as our measure of inequality.6 The Gini index is used extensively in the public
economics literature when dealing with taxation and income redistribution
across individuals (see Lambert, 1993). It is related to the Lorenz curve of the
income distribution, which can be constructed by lining individuals up in
ascending order of incomes and observing them as they parade by. As they
pass by, each individual hands over their income. Let p denote the proportion
of people who have passed by at a given time and let L(p) denote the
proportion of total income that has been handed in at that time. The Lorenz
curve is simply the graph of L(p) against p.7
The Gini coefficient measures twice the area between the 45-degree line
(the Lorenz curve with complete equality) and the Lorenz curve of the actual
income distribution:
G p L p p= − ( )[ ]∫2
0
1
d
or equivalently
G F x
x
f x x
a
b
= − − ( )[ ] ( )∫1 2 1 μ d (1)
where a and b are the lower and upper bounds of income, F and f are,
respectively, the cumulative distribution and the density function of incomes,
and m is mean income (Lambert, 1993). The second formulation makes it
clear that the Gini coefficient is equal to one minus twice a weighted average
of mean-normalized incomes (x/m). Crucially, the weights, given by 1 – F(x),
are determined by the relative rank of agents’ incomes in the distribution.
The lowest income receives a weight of one; weights decrease as we move to
the highest income, which receives a weight of zero. As will become clear, the
ability to identify both a rank component and a relative income component
in the construction of the Gini coefficient plays a key role in our analysis.
When considering the bivariate distribution of incomes at two time
periods, 1 and 2, an analogous concept can be defined as twice the area
5See, for example, Jenkins (1991) or Cowell (2000) for surveys.
6An important advantage of the Gini index over measures commonly used in the convergence
literature is that it satisfies the ‘principle of transfers’ according to which inequality is
necessarily increased by a transfer of income from a poorer agent to a richer agent.
7See Gastwirth (1971) for a formal definition.
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between the 45-degree line and the concentration curve. To construct the
concentration curve, line up individuals in ascending order of period 1
incomes as before, but imagine that, as they pass by, each individual hands
over their second-period income. The concentration curve plots p, the pro-
portion of people who have passed by, against C(p), the proportion of
second-period income that has been handed in. The associated index is called
the concentration coefficient, which we denote as C12 , and is defined as
C p C p p12
0
1
2= − ( )[ ]∫ d
Integrating this expression by parts, C12 can be re-expressed as
C F x
y
h x y x y
a
b
a
b
1
2 1
2
1 2 1= − − ( )[ ] ( )∫∫ μ , d d (2)
where F1(x) is the cumulative distribution function of period 1 incomes, m2 is
the mean period 2 incomes and h is the bivariate density function of incomes
at periods 1 and 2. Again, it becomes evident that the concentration coeffi-
cient is determined by a weighted average of period 2 mean-normalized
incomes, where the weights are determined by period 1 relative ranks
(1 – F1(x)).
Using these two measures, Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006) have shown
that the change in the Gini coefficient between period 1 and period 2 can be
meaningfully decomposed as
ΔG G G G C G C R BC= − = −( ) − −( ) = −2 1 2 12 1 12 (3)
where Gt is the Gini coefficient of period t incomes. When the units of analysis
are countries or regions, the left-hand side of (3) provides a direct measure of
s-convergence; DG > 0 corresponds to rising inequality or income divergence
and DG < 0 reflects falling income inequality or income convergence. Equa-
tion (3) decomposes this change into two parts, R and BC. The second term,
BC, is a weighted average of (mean-normalized) GDP growth in each region
where the weights are given by the regions’ ranks in the initial distribution of
incomes.8 In the tax literature, where pre-tax and post-tax incomes are com-
pared, this term is referred to as the Reynolds–Smolensky index of vertical
equity that is proportional to the Kakwani measure of tax progressivity
(Kakwani, 1977). BC equals zero if growth rates are equal in all regions. BC
is positive (inequality falls) if growth tends to be higher in poorer regions; in
keeping with the tax literature we call this a progressive growth process. The
8To see this, write the Gini coefficient at period 1 as
G F x
x
h x y x y
a
b
a
b
1 1
1
1 2 1= − − ( )[ ] ( )∫∫ μ , d d
and compare it with expression (2) for the concentration index.
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greater the concentration of GDP growth among low-income regions, the
larger BC becomes and hence the larger the reduction in inequality. In
contrast, BC is negative if growth tends to be higher among richer regions, a
factor leading to an increase in inequality. Since BC captures the extent to
which faster growth among poor regions reduces inequality it has a clear
interpretation as a distributive measure of b-convergence.
As argued by Friedman (1992) the effect of b-convergence on inequality
is mitigated by the re-ranking of countries, which occurs if initially poor
regions overtake richer regions. Once a poor region catches up with a richer
region, further increases in the GDP of the initially poor region will push
inequality upward again (with a reversal of ranks). R, in our decomposition,
measures this effect. In calculating R only incomes from the final distribution
of income are used. However, the positioning of a country or region in the
income parade used to construct the aggregate measure of inequality is
allowed to change. When calculating G2, countries are ordered and weighted
according to period 2 ranking, while the calculation of C12 uses the period 1
ranking.9 The R term, which can be seen as the residual difference between
BC and DG, quantifies the offsetting effect of re-ranking (positional mobility)
on the inequality reduction. This captures the fact that b-convergence need
not necessarily translate into lower overall inequality if poor countries leap-
frog richer countries and, in this sense, quantifies the concerns expressed by
Friedman (1992).
Viewing the change in inequality in this way allows us to identify easily
the relative contribution of both re-ranking and progressive growth
(b-convergence) to the overall change in inequality (s-convergence). In addi-
tion, our specification is quite general. Equation (3) is an accounting identity
and therefore holds without any additional assumptions; there is nothing in
our framework that requires the underlying growth process to be constant
across countries, linear in income or monotonic as required when
b-convergence is estimated in a linear regression framework. Our decompo-
sition therefore provides a non-parametric framework that identifies the key
components of the convergence process.10
Figures 1–5 provide illustrative examples, in a two-country setting, of
the range of income dynamics that are easily captured by equation (3).
Figures 1 and 2 both illustrate situations where b-convergence and
s-convergence coexist. In the first situation there is no leapfrogging. In our
approach the s-convergence is captured by a fall in the Gini coefficient. All of
9Write the Gini coefficient at period 2 as
G F y
y
h x y x y
a
b
a
b
2 2
2
1 2 1= − − ( )[ ] ( )∫∫ μ , d d
and compare it with equation (2).
10The decomposition presented here can be easily extended to situations where the generalized
Gini coefficient is used to measure convergence. For a discussion of the generalized Gini
coefficient, see Donaldson and Weymark (1980) and Yitzhaki (1983).
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this reduction can be attributed to the progressivity of income growth, so that
DG = -BC. The absence of re-ranking is reflected in R = 0. In the second
example incomes converge despite re-ranking. This would be captured in our
framework by values of BC and R such that –BC < 0, R > 0 and BC > R,
highlighting the dominant role of b-convergence in reducing inequality.
ΔG = –BC < 0; R = 0
A
B
lo
g 
(G
D
P
)
Time
Fig. 1 b-Convergence, s-Convergence, No Leapfrogging
ΔG < 0; R > 0, –BC < 0, BC > R
A
B
lo
g 
(G
D
P
)
Time
Fig. 2 b-Convergence, s-Convergence and Leapfrogging
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Figures 3 and 4 both illustrate situations where there is no
s-convergence (DG = 0). In Fig. 3, however, poor countries grow faster than
rich countries so that we have substantial b-convergence. This is masked in
the overall inequality figure by the complete re-ranking of the two countries.
ΔG = 0; R > 0, –BC < 0, BC = R
lo
g 
(G
D
P
)
Time
A
B
Fig. 3 b-Convergence, No s-Convergence, Leapfrogging
ΔG = R = BC = 0
lo
g 
(G
D
P
)
Time
A
B
Fig. 4 No b-Convergence, No s-Convergence, No Leapfrogging
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Our approach will identify the contribution of b-convergence to reduced
inequality in these data but this will be entirely offset by the contribution of
the leapfrogging component, so that BC = R > 0. Not only does our frame-
work identify the tendency of poor countries to grow faster but it also
simultaneously quantifies the extent to which this is offset by re-ranking in
the data. In contrast to Fig. 3, Fig. 4 illustrates another situation in which
there is no s-convergence. However, this case differs from that in Fig. 3 in
that the new environment is completely static. Again DG = 0, but in this case
our decomposition would result in BC = R = 0. Our framework would iden-
tify the growth profile in Fig. 4 as one without either b-convergence or
leapfrogging.
There are theoretical reasons as to why one might wish to distinguish
between the examples in Figs 3 and 4. A number of authors, e.g. Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Islam (2003), have shown that income per capita
in a stochastic Solow growth model converges to a stationary distribution
with a constant (non-zero) variance, which depends on the variance of the
stochastic component of the model. As noted by de la Fuente (1997), this
implies that ‘in the long-run we should observe a fluid distribution in which
relative positions of the different countries change rapidly’ (p. 36). There-
fore, the steady-state income dynamics should correspond to Fig. 3 rather
than Fig. 4. Our framework provides a straightforward way of identifying
such outcomes.
lo
g 
(G
D
P
)
Time
A
B
ΔG > 0; R > 0, –BC < 0, BC < R
Fig. 5 b-Convergence, s-Divergence, Leapfrogging
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Finally, Fig. 5 illustrates a situation where we have b-convergence and
s-divergence. Here the effect of the leapfrogging more than offsets the reduc-
tion in inequality arising from b-convergence. In this case we have DG > 0,
-BC < 0, R > 0 and R > BC.
These examples also help to clarify an important point. Sala-i-Martin
(1996b) begins his paper by defining b-convergence in the traditional way,
noting that ‘there is b-convergence if poor economies tend to grow faster than
rich ones’. However, later in the paper he suggests that b-convergence studies
the mobility of income within the same distribution. As a result, some
researchers have drawn parallels between b-convergence and measures of
rank mobility, defining indices of rank concordance as direct measures of
b-convergence (Boyle and McCarthy, 1997). Clearly for a distribution to
exhibit b-convergence, without s-convergence, it must be the case that coun-
tries are changing ranks (Fig. 3). However, as Fig. 1 shows, it is possible to
have b-convergence without any positional mobility; it is also possible to
have rank mobility without b-convergence. b-Convergence simply requires
poor countries to grow faster than rich countries, irrespective of whether or
not there is leapfrogging. Both the Barro-regression approach and our
approach would indicate a strong role for b-convergence for the process
illustrated in Fig. 1; measures based on rank correlations would not. While
the issue of positional mobility is interesting, it is captured by our measure R;
this, in turn, measures the offsetting effect of re-ranking/leapfrogging on
s-convergence and not b-convergence.
Quah (1996) uses diagrams similar to these to argue that neither
b-convergence nor s-convergence, alone, delivers a convincing description of
the dynamics of evolving distributions. Quah (1996) proposes an alternative
procedure based on estimation of stochastic kernels;11 our analysis builds on
established work in public economics to offer a coherent complement to the
kernel density approach. Our framework integrates three important features
of the convergence process, s-convergence, b-convergence and leapfrogging,
in a way that is easy to implement and interpret. The parsimony evident in
our decomposition comes at a cost; while our analytical framework accom-
modates nonlinear growth processes, it cannot identify whether or not these
nonlinearities lead to the emergence of convergence clubs.12 We recognize
that the emergence of convergence clubs has an important role to play in
studying income dynamics and we briefly document the existence of conver-
gence clubs in our data summary section. However, we believe that the
provision of a rich, though partial, non-parametric summary of the mobility
process, which links competing measures of convergence at a fraction of the
computational cost of alternative approaches, is a useful contribution to the
literature on income convergence. Quantifying the polarization of the income
11For a related discussion, see Maasoumi et al. (2007).
12Canova (2004) discusses the identification of convergence clubs in detail.
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distribution across countries around convergence clubs is conceptually dis-
tinct from quantifying overall convergence and requires complementary, but
different, tools.13
3 Data and Results
3.1 Convergence across Countries
In this section, we illustrate our approach with an analysis of income con-
vergence between 1960 and 2000, using data from the latest version of the
Penn World Tables.14 The Penn World Tables provide price-adjusted income
measures for a large sample of countries for the years 1950–2000 and have
been used extensively in previous studies of convergence. In this paper, we use
data for a sample of 98 countries that provide complete data over the period
1960–2000. We also look at income dynamics for a restricted set of 25
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries. Income is measured as real per capita gross domestic product in 1996
international prices.15 The countries used in our analysis are listed in Table 1.
Figures 6 and 7 provide a graphical summary of the evolution of income
inequality over the sample period. Figure 6 summarizes the data for the
OECD sample, while Fig. 7 provides the results for the full sample. We focus
first on the OECD countries. For the purposes of drawing these graphs
incomes are expressed relative to the overall mean for that year; values above
one correspond to high-income countries and values below one represent
low-income countries. The north east and south west quadrants of Fig. 6 are
the empirical quantile functions of (mean-normalized) income; they plot the
relationship between income and rank in each of the two years. As shown in
Section 2, the Gini coefficient is a weighted integral of the area under these
curves with weights decreasing as we move from poor to rich countries.
The north west quadrant maps the relationship between incomes in each
of the marginal distributions. Income in 1960 (x-coordinate) is plotted
against income in 2000 (y-coordinate). The 45-degree line corresponds to a
situation of proportional income growth. We see that among OECD coun-
tries, those with low initial incomes have seen their incomes rise fastest over
this period. Our progressivity measure, BC, is equivalent to a weighted
average of the individual distance of each observation from the 45-degree
line, with greater weights given to countries with lower initial incomes.
13Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (2004) discuss this distinction in detail in the context
of personal income distribution analysis.
14Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.1, Center for
International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October 2002.
15For the results presented in this paper all countries are weighted equally, although our proce-
dure can easily accommodate individual country weights. For a discussion of the impact of
using population weights when analysing cross-country income inequality see Jones (1997).
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The south east quadrant captures the extent of leapfrogging. Deviations
from the 45-degree line in this quadrant show the extent of re-ranking;
countries above the 45-degree line have increased their rank over time and
vice versa. The results show that almost every country changed rank over this
period; countries such as Ireland, Japan and Norway moved up the distribu-
tion; countries such as Sweden, New Zealand and Britain moved down. There
is no immediate mapping from this graphical presentation of leapfrogging to
our summary measure R; the easiest way to visualize the impact of leapfrog-
ging on relative incomes is to look at the nature and composition of income
clusters in both years. Looking at the north west quadrant for 1960 (along the
horizontal axis) we can identify approximately three clusters of countries: a
low-income cluster consisting of Korea, Turkey, Mexico, Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Japan and Ireland; a high-income cluster involving Luxembourg,
USA, Switzerland and New Zealand; and a cluster of middle-income coun-
tries made up of the remaining OECD members. Switching axis to look at
2000, there still appears to be a low-income, middle-income and high-income
cluster; furthermore, our graph allows us to look at compositional changes
within and between these clusters. We notice that Switzerland and New
Zealand have fallen out of the high-income group, with Switzerland moving
down into the middle group and New Zealand moving towards the low-
income cluster; the big movers out of the low-income group were Ireland and
Japan, who have now joined the middle-income countries.
Table 1
Full Sample of 98 Countries Included in the Analysis
Argentina Costa Rica India Malawi Swedena
Australiaa Denmarka Irelanda Malaysia Switzerlanda
Austriaa Dominican Republic Iran Niger Seychelles
Burundi Algeria Icelanda Nigeria Syria
Belgiuma Ecuador Israel Nicaragua Chad
Benin Egypt Italya Netherlandsa Togo
Burkina Faso Ethiopia Jamaica Norwaya Thailand
Bangladesh Finlanda Jordan Nepal Trinidad and
Tobago
Bolivia Francea Japana New Zealanda Turkeya
Brazil Gabon Kenya Pakistan Tanzania
Barbados Ghana Koreaa Panama United Kingdoma
Canadaa Guinea Sri Lanka Peru Uganda
Chile Gambia Lesotho Philippines Uruguay
China Guinea-Bissau Luxembourga Portugala USAa
Cote d’Ivoire Equatorial Guinea Morocco Paraguay Venezuela
Cameroon Greecea Madagascar Romania South Africa
Republic of Congo Guatemala Mexicoa Rwanda Zambia
Colombia Hong Kong Mali Senegal Zimbabwe
Comoros Honduras Mozambique Spaina
Cape Verde Indonesia Mauritius El Salvador
aMembers of the OECD sample. Of the 30 countries currently listed as members of the OECD, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Germany did not have consistent data for the period 1960–2000.
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Figure 7 provides the same analysis for the full sample of 98 countries.
The growth in relative incomes for this sample tends to be concentrated in the
middle of the distribution, with relative incomes at the very top of the
distribution falling. Although identifying individual countries becomes more
difficult, it is apparent that much of the leapfrogging that occurred over this
time period resulted in countries changing positions within groups; relatively
few countries changed groups.
We can use the decomposition presented in equation (3) to look at these
changes more formally. Table 2 reports the Gini coefficient for the full data
and for the restricted set of OECD countries, at 10-year intervals, for the
period 1960–2000. Breaking the sample period into 10-year intervals accom-
modates inter-temporal heterogeneity in the growth process. For compari-
son, we also report the standard deviation of log income. Looking at the
OECD countries we see that the overall trend is similar for the two measures
and indicates a substantial reduction of income dispersion over the period
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Fig. 6 Graphical Summary of Evolution of Income Inequality among OECD Countries
1960–2000
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1960–2000. The majority of this reduction took place between 1960 and 1980;
convergence slowed down significantly after this period.16 Results for the
world as a whole confirm what has been established in many previous studies:
incomes diverged substantially over the period.
16This slowdown in convergence among developed countries was discussed in O’Neill (1996).
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Fig. 7 Graphical Summary of Evolution of Income Inequality among All Countries
1960–2000
Table 2
Relative Trends in Income Inequality
Time period
25 OECD countries Full sample (N = 98)
Gini sln(GDP) Gini sln(GDP)
1960 0.253 0.547 0.483 0.928
1970 0.205 0.472 0.503 1.02
1980 0.174 0.418 0.510 1.08
1990 0.169 0.385 0.538 1.14
2000 0.171 0.385 0.553 1.22
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The results in Tables 3 and 4 decompose these changes in income
inequality using the framework outlined in Section 2. The rows of the tables
refer to different time periods, while the columns refer to the various com-
ponents of the convergence process; the second column shows the change in
the Gini coefficient and measures s-convergence; the third and fourth
columns present the respective contributions of progressive income growth
(–BC) and re-ranking/leapfrogging (R) to the change in overall inequality.17
The final column reports the traditional measure of b-convergence derived
from a Barro regression.
Looking at the results in Table 3 we see that leapfrogging plays a minor
role in the cross-country income dynamics of OECD countries; re-ranking
did little to offset the reduction in inequality induced by b-convergence
between 1960 and 1980.18 Furthermore, we see that the stable income distri-
bution observed over the last 10 years reflects a static distribution; neither
leapfrogging nor b-convergence contributed anything to changing income
dispersion across countries over this period. The last column presents our
estimates of the traditional measure of b-convergence from growth regres-
17The standard errors on the decomposition terms were constructed using a classical paired
bootstrap procedure with 1000 replications. At each iteration the unit of resampling was the
vector containing both initial and final period incomes.
18Using measures of rank correlations, Boyle and McCarthy (1997) also concluded that ‘posi-
tional mobility’ was relatively unimportant over this time. However, our approach differs
in two ways: first, we can determine precisely the contribution of this component to changes
in overall inequality; second, we do not equate positional mobility with b-convergence.
Table 3
Income Convergence Dynamics for 25 OECD Countries: 1960–2000 (Standard
Errors in Parentheses)
Time period s-Convergence DG b-Convergence –BC Re-ranking R Barro regression b
1960–2000 -0.083 (0.034) -0.116 (0.035) 0.033 (0.011) -0.012 (0.003)
1960–1970 -0.048 (0.013) -0.056 (0.015) 0.008 (0.004) -0.016 (0.005)
1970–1980 -0.031 (0.010) -0.045 (0.010) 0.014 (0.007) -0.013 (0.004)
1980–1990 -0.005 (0.014) -0.013 (0.013) 0.008 (0.004) -0.012 (0.006)
1990–2000 0.002 (0.019) -0.009 (0.022) 0.011 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006)
Table 4
Income Convergence Dynamics for the Full Sample of 98 Countries: 1960–2000
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Time period s-Convergence DG b-Convergence –BC Re-ranking R Barro regression b
1960–2000 0.07 (0.020) 0.017 (0.020) 0.053 (0.013) 0.004 (0.002)
1960–1970 0.02 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008) 0.008 (0.002) 0.006 (0.002)
1970–1980 0.007 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) 0.010 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
1980–1990 0.028 (0.007) 0.020 (0.007) 0.008 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002)
1990–2000 0.015 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) 0.005 (0.001) 0.007 (0.002)
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sions; the results are reported so that a negative b indicates convergence. For
the most part, these results are consistent with our earlier analysis. The early
periods are characterized by significant b-convergence; this is absent in the
later years. However, it is worthwhile making two observations. First, we
observe both leapfrogging and values of |b| < 1 in every period under consid-
eration. Therefore, we need to be careful when interpreting claims that |b| < 1
rules out leapfrogging; this applies only to ‘deterministic’ leapfrogging, where
poor economies are systematically predicted to get ahead of rich economies.
A value of |b| < 1 says nothing about positional mobility in general.19 Second,
it is interesting to compare the full period from 1960 to 2000 with that from
1980 to 1990. For both periods the estimated b coefficients from the growth
equations are almost identical. However, when we look at columns 2 and 3 we
see that, for the two periods in question, the dynamics underlying the income
distribution were substantially different. For the overall period progressive
income growth had a significant equalizing effect. In the later period,
however, total income inequality did not change. Furthermore, our decom-
position shows that neither leapfrogging nor b-convergence had a significant
impact on inequality over this period. This is an illustration of Friedman’s
concern that relying on Barro regressions may mask important differences
in income dynamics. Therefore, even if we accept the tendency for Barro
regressions to return a rate of convergence of 2 per cent over a wide range of
different examples, our framework shows how the equalizing effects of these
processes may differ substantially.20
Table 4 presents the results for the full sample. In contrast to the
OECD sample we find little evidence of b-convergence. For almost every
period considered the regressive nature of income growth and leapfrogging
combined to increase income dispersion. When the full 40-year period is
considered we see that leapfrogging was the dominant force driving income
dynamics; this at a time when growth was regressive. The combined results
in Tables 3 and 4 quantify Maasoumi et al.’s (2007) assertion that ‘there is
much “churning,” or “exchange mobility,” and no convergence within the
non-OECDs and a tangible convergence and “growth mobility” within the
OECDs’. Although the results in Table 4 are, for the most part, consistent
with the traditional Barro-regression results, we again see examples of how
growth processes with similar coefficients from the Barro regression
19It is possible to extend our decomposition to incorporate systematic and stochastic components
and details of such an extension are given in the Appendix. Alternative discussions are given
in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), Duclos et al. (2003) and Urban and Lambert (2005).
Distinguishing between systematic and stochastic components would require a reliable
estimator of the mean of final-period income conditional on initial income. This is likely to
prove difficult given our sample sizes. As a result we focus on the simpler decomposition
given by equation (3).
20Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) make a related point in a different context, when noting that
tax schedules with similar measures of structural progression can differ substantially in
their effective redistribution.
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(1970–80 and 1980–90) may be associated with different reductions in
inequality. These differences are captured by our distribution-based
measure of b-convergence.
3.2 Convergence across Regions
In this section we use our framework to study regional income dynamics with
data taken from Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). These data were used by
Sala-i-Martin (1996b) to study regional cohesion. In particular, we focus on
the regions of the USA and Japan. The dates for which the analysis is
conducted depend on data availability and differ across data sets. The data
for the USA refer to real annual personal income per capita for each of the 48
contiguous states from 1900 to 1990. The Japanese data measure real per
capita income between 1955 and 1990 for the 47 prefectures, as collected by
the Economic Planning Agency of Japan. More details on these data, includ-
ing summary statistics and maps illustrating the regions under consideration,
are available in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the decomposition for the US states
and Japanese regions, respectively. As before, column 3 reports our modified
distribution-based measure of b-convergence (–BC), column 4 shows the
contribution of leapfrogging (R) and column 5 is the traditional b coefficient
from a Barro regression. For both regional data sets we see a dominant role
for b-convergence in reducing income inequality across regions. This has
been offset to some extent by the effects of leapfrogging but in both cases the
progressivity effect is about four times the size of the contribution of leap-
frogging. This captures growth processes where substantial b-convergence
leads directly to s-convergence. Interestingly, our results suggest that con-
vergence was larger in the US sample (as measured by both DG and BC), but
that does not appear in the Barro regressions.
Table 5
Income Convergence Dynamics for 48 US States: 1900–90 (Standard
Errors in Parentheses)
Time period s-Convergence DG b-Convergence –BC Re-ranking R Barro regression b
1900–1990 -0.141 (0.023) -0.187 (0.026) 0.047 (0.011) -0.009 (0.001)
Table 6
Income Convergence Dynamics for 47 Japanese Prefectures: 1955–90 (Standard Errors
in Parentheses)
Time period s-Convergence DG b-Convergence –BC Re-ranking R Barro regression b
1955–1990 -0.047 (0.011) -0.069 (0.010) 0.022 (0.006) -0.011 (0.001)
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4 Conclusion
The results presented in this paper are consistent with earlier studies of
inequality and growth. However, we believe that the approach adopted rep-
resents a useful development in the analysis of cross-country and regional
income dynamics. The techniques we use allow us to ‘marry’ the approaches
advocated by Friedman and Quah with those suggested by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin. In doing so we develop an integrated framework involving concepts
that, up to now, have often been viewed as competitors in the analysis of
income dynamics. We adapt concepts originally developed to study the pro-
gressivity of the tax system and use the new approach to study cross-country
and regional income dynamics. Our framework allows us to evaluate and
understand the connections between the various sources of convergence dis-
cussed in the literature, while at the same time accommodating quite general
specifications of the underlying growth process.
Our analysis illustrates how studies relying on the coefficient from a
linear regression model to capture b-convergence may hide important differ-
ences in the income dynamics. Our preferred measure of b-convergence cap-
tures the extent to which faster income growth among low-income countries
reduces income dispersion. Our results show significant reductions in inequal-
ity among the OECD, US states and Japanese prefectures because of faster
growth among low-income regions; for these samples the occurrence of leap-
frogging did little to offset the reduction in overall dispersion induced by
b-convergence.
In contrast to recently developed approaches based on the estimation of
full-scale conditional density functions, our approach quantifies key features
of (global) convergence in just three summary parameters, which are easy to
estimate. This parsimony, however, comes at cost in that our approach does
not readily identify or quantify other features of distributional changes such
as polarization around (local) convergence clubs. It may also be useful to
extend our approach to allow further explanation of the processes driving the
observed convergence patterns. Further decomposition of our measures into
systematic and stochastic components, as outlined in the Appendix, offers a
potential starting point. We believe that developments in this direction may
be a useful avenue for future research.
Appendix
Measuring Convergence with Systematic and Stochastic Components
When analysing income dynamics it is sometimes useful to distinguish between ‘sys-
tematic’ and ‘stochastic’ income growth. The systematic component of final income is
defined as the expected final-period income conditional on initial income. However, a
country’s observed final-period income may deviate from their expected income and
these deviations represent the stochastic component of final income. Identifying the
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contributions of ‘systematic’ and ‘stochastic’ income growth to the overall conver-
gence and re-ranking requires an estimate of the conditional mean income. An
approach commonly used in the taxation literature is to base the estimation on groups
of close equals, defined across the range of incomes.21 Specifically, suppose we identify
N groups of close equals in period one, Gj, j = 1, . . . , N. For any country k, belonging
to group j, we can, without loss of generality, write y y ek G kj
2 2
= + , where yGj
2 denotes
expected income in period two conditional on membership of group j in period one
and ek represents a zero-mean stochastic deviation from the expected income. The
change in inequality can then be written as
ΔG C C C C C C C C
ER SR EBC
G G
G G
= −( ) + −( )[ ] − −( ) + −( )[ ]
= +( ) −
2
1
2
2
2 2
1
1
1 1 1
2
+( )SBC (A1)
where Cji is the concentration coefficient of incomes i with respect to j rankings. For
example, C22 is the concentration coefficient of final-period income when ranked
according to final income (or equivalently the final-period Gini coefficient), while CG1
is the concentration curve of initial incomes when ranked on the basis of expected
group means in the final period. When ranking countries on the basis of expected
group means we order first by expected group mean and then within each group by
initial income.
The terms inside the first square brackets in (A1) decompose our original
re-ranking term, R, into a systematic or expected re-ranking component (ER) that
arises due to nonlinearities in the conditional mean function and a stochastic re-ranking
component (SR) arising due to country deviations around the growth path. Whenever
the conditional mean function is monotonic, CG2 will be equal to C12,ERwill equal zero
and all the changes in our re-ranking term will reflect stochastic shocks given by SR.
The terms inside the second square bracket reflect our decomposition of our
b-convergence term (BC). The first component (EBC) measures the b-convergence
between initial incomes and expected final-period income, when both are weighted on
the basis of rankings in the initial income distribution. It captures progression due to
the systematic growth process and incorporates any nonlinearities that may exist
in the process. The final term (SBC) captures b-convergence associated with differ-
ences between expected and actual second-period incomes, again with fixed rankings.
Intuitively this term captures the effect of ‘within-group convergence’. If all countries
received their expected incomes in the second period this term would be zero. If on the
other hand initially poorer countries benefited disproportionately from the observed
shocks then SBC would be positive, leading to a fall in inequality.22 SBC is negative
and inequality rises if richer countries benefit most from the shocks.
21See van de Ven et al. (2001) for a discussion on how you might define the close-equals groups
optimally in terms of class width.
22This decomposition is best considered when there are no exact equals in the initial income
distribution. If the groups are selected on the basis of exact equals then it is difficult to know
how to order individuals within a group. One could consider defining the concentration
curve as the average curve across all possible orderings. This is equivalent to assigning yG
to each member of the group so that the ordering does not matter (see, for example,
Schechtman and Yitzhaki, 2003). If this is the approach adopted then by construction C12
will equal CG1 and the H term in our extended decomposition will equal zero. In the absence
of exact equals, however, these need not be equal and the SBC term retains the interpre-
tation provided above.
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Implementation of this extended decomposition requires a precise estimate of the
conditional mean function for groups of close equals that can capture potential
nonlinearities in the growth process. Unfortunately, given the relatively small number
of observations in our samples, obtaining reliable, smooth estimates proves to be
difficult. Therefore, we do not attempt to distinguish between the systematic and
random components in this paper and focus instead on the simpler decomposition
given by equation (3).
References
Barro, R. and Sala-Martin, X. (1992). ‘Convergence’, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 100, No. 2, pp. 223–251.
Barro, R. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1995). Economic Growth, New York, McGraw-Hill.
Boyle, G. and McCarthy, T. (1997). ‘A Simple Measure of b-Convergence’, Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 257–264.
Canova, P. (2004). ‘Testing for Convergence Clubs in Income per Capita: a Predictive
Density Approach’, International Economic Review, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 49–77.
Cowell, F. A. (2000). ‘Measurement of Inequality’, in A. B. Atkinson and F.
Bourguignon (eds), Handbook of Income Distribution, Amsterdam, North
Holland, pp. 87–166.
Dardanoni, V. and Lambert, P. (2002). ‘Progressivity Comparisons’, Journal of Public
Economics, Vol. 86, pp. 99–122.
Donaldson, D. and Weymark, J. (1980). ‘A Single-parameter Gerneralization of the
Gini Indices of Inequality’, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 22, pp. 67–86.
Duclos, J.-Y., Jalbert, V. and Araar, A. (2003). ‘Classical Horizontal Inequity and
Reranking: an Integrating Approach’, CIRPEE Working Paper 03-06.
Esteban, J. M. and Ray, D. (1994). ‘On the Measurement of Polarization’, Economet-
rica, Vol. 62, No. 4, pp. 819–851.
Esteban, J. M., Duclos, J.-Y. and Ray, D. (2004). ‘Polarization: Concepts, Measure-
ment, Estimation’, Econometrica, Vol. 72, No. 6, pp. 1737–1772.
Fiaschi, D. and Lavezzi, A. M. (2003). ‘Distribution Dynamics and Nonlinear
Growth’, Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, pp. 379–401.
Friedman, M. (1992). ‘Do Old Fallacies Ever Die?’, Journal of Economic Literature,
Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 2129–2132.
de la Fuente, A. (1997). ‘The Empirics of Growth and Convergence: a Selective
Review’, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol. 21, pp. 23–73.
de la Fuente, A. (2003). ‘Convergence Equations and Income Dynamics: the Sources
of OECD Convergence, 1970–1995’, Economica, Vol. 70, pp. 655–671.
Gastwirth, J. L. (1971). ‘A General Definition of the Lorenz curve’, Econometrica,
Vol. 39, pp. 1037–1039.
de Groot, H., Abreu, M. and Florax, R. (2005). ‘A Meta-analysis of Beta-
convergence: the Legendary 2%’, Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 19, No. 3,
pp. 389–420.
Hart, P. (1995). ‘Galtonian Regression across Countries and the Convergence of
Productivity’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp.
287–293.
Islam, N. (2003). ‘What Have We Learnt from the Convergence Debate’, Journal of
Economic Surveys, Vol. 17, pp. 309–362.
Jenkins, S. P. (1991). ‘The Measurement of Income Inequality’, in L. Osberg (ed.),
Economic Inequality and Poverty: International Perspectives, New York, M.E.
Sharpe, pp. 3–38.
Integrated Framework for Analysing Income Convergence 19
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester 2008
Jenkins, S. and Van Kerm, P. (2006). ‘Trends in Income Inequality, Pro-poor Income
Growth and Income Mobility’, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp.
531–548.
Jones, C. (1997). ‘On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 19–36.
Kakwani, N. (1977). ‘Measurement of Tax Progressivity: an International Compari-
son’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 87, pp. 71–80.
Kalaitzidakis, P., Mamuneas, T. and Stengos, T. (2000). ‘A Non-linear Sensitivity
Analysis of Cross-country Regressions’, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33,
pp. 604–617.
Lambert, P. (1993). The Distribution and Redistribution of Income, Manchester,
Manchester University Press.
Lerman, R. and Yitzhaki, S. (1995). ‘Changing Ranks and the Impact of Taxes on
Transfers’, National Tax Journal, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 45–59.
Maasoumi, A., Racine, J. and Stengos, T. (2007). ‘Growth and Convergence: a Profile
of Distribution Dynamics and Mobility’, Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 136, No.
2, pp. 483–508.
O’Neill, D. (1996). ‘Education and Income Growth: Implications for Cross-country
Inequality’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 103, No. 6, pp. 1289–1301.
Phillips, P. and Sul, D. (2003). ‘The Elusive Empirical Shadow of Growth Conver-
gence’, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1398.
Quah, D. (1993). ‘Galton’s Fallacy and Tests of the Convergence Hypothesis’, Scan-
dinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, pp. 427–443.
Quah, D. (1996). ‘Empirics for Economic Growth and Convergence’, European Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 40, pp. 1353–1375.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996a). ‘The Classical Approach to Convergence Analysis’, Eco-
nomic Journal, Vol. 106, pp. 1019–1036.
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1996b). ‘Regional Cohesion: Evidence and Theories of Regional
Growth and Convergence’, European Economic Review, Vol. 40, pp. 1325–1352.
Schechtman, E. and Yitzhaki, S. (2003). ‘A Family of Correlation Coefficients Based
on the Extended Gini Index’, Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp.
129–146.
Sugimoto, Y. (2006). ‘Inequality, Growth and Overtaking’, Macroeconomic Dyna-
mics, Vol. 10, No. 5, pp. 625–651.
Urban, I. and Lambert, P. (2005). ‘Redistribution, Horizontal Inequity and Rerank-
ing: How to Measure Them Properly’, University of Oregon. http://
economics.uoregon.edu/papers/UO-2005-12_Lambert_Redistribution.pdf
van de Ven, J., Creedy, J. and Lambert, P. (2001). ‘Close Equals and Calculation of
the Vertical, Horizontal and Reranking Effects of Taxation’, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 63, pp. 381–394.
Wodon, Q. and Yitzhaki, S. (2005). ‘Growth and Convergence: a Social Welfare
Framework’, Review of Income and Wealth, Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 443–454.
Yitzhaki, S. (1983). ‘On an Extension of the Gini Inequality Index’, International
Economic Review, Vol. 24, pp. 617–628.
The Manchester School20
© 2008 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester 2008
